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Clenched in the JAWS of America? 
Canadian Sovereignty and the Joint 
Arctic Weather Stations, 1946-1972
Daniel Heidt
Sovereignty is a complex subject but can be roughly separated into two forms. De jure sovereignty is the degree to which other states accept a country’s claim to a geographic area. It is the diplomatic or “official” 
territorial claim. If there is no competing claim for territory then Canada is, 
at least ostensibly, sovereign. De facto sovereignty is how these claims are 
manifested “on the ground” within a geographic region. The two aspects 
are complementary. For instance, if one country invades another but is con-
demned by the international community, the invader may eventually chose 
to withdraw despite exercising de facto sovereignty. Conversely, insufficient 
de facto sovereignty can compromise a de jure claim by making a state’s claim 
seem unjustified.1 
Given the Arctic’s remoteness and expansiveness, continuous occupa-
tion is not required or expected. Routine patrols, the delivery of mail, or the 
administering of law are all means of asserting control. Many historians 
argue that Canada’s de facto sovereignty initiatives have been insufficient. 
Shelagh Grant argues that “‘paper guarantees’ did not always translate into 
practice” as Americans violated Canadian laws or diplomatic agreements. 
Accordingly, she concludes that the result was “a compromise: optimum se-
curity with minimal, but perceived unavoidable loss of sovereignty.”2 More 
moderately, Adam Lajeunesse argues that the United States was “exceed-
ingly careful and tactful with issues of sovereignty,” but that: 
rather than seeking the effective control which would have al-
lowed Canada to assert a firm policy, the government focused 
its efforts on using the American need for continental defence to 
secure implicit recognition from the U.S. while trying to mini-
mize the perception of American control and involvement in the 
Arctic.3
Thus, Canada tried to “minimize the public perceptions of American con-
trol and involvement in the Arctic” while exaggerating its own to the press.4 
Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 4, 2011
Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security: Historical Perspectives Pages 145–169
© Centre for Military and Strategic Studies http://cmss.ucalgary.ca/
CLENCHED IN THE JAWS OF AMERICA?
146
Unlike Grant, Lajeunesse does not describe American violations of Canadian 
sovereignty, but instead insists that the dominance of the United States in 
joint Arctic programs, by definition, compromised Canada’s ability to control 
events “on the ground.” Moreover “securing actual control over the Arctic 
was never its [Ottawa’s] primary concern” as Canada continued to rely on 
mere de jure sovereignty to maintain its claims.5 Although Canada’s lim-
ited investment in de facto sovereignty was not a problem at the time, “the 
Canadian reliance on the U.S. military throughout the 1940s and 1950s in the 
Arctic left the country incapable of asserting any official claim” to combat 
subsequent explicit challenges to Arctic sovereignty such as the 1969 sailing 
of the SS Manhattan through the Northwest passage.6
 Revisionist scholars describe Canadian and American past Arctic 
cooperation more favourably. Joseph Jockel argues that mutual respect 
dominated the Canadian-American defence relationship and that American 
officials did not “spend endless hours plotting to rob Canada of its sover-
eignty.”7 Focusing more on the Canadian side of events, David Bercuson 
contends that: “Canada established the policies and procedures by which 
it safeguarded its interests and protected its sovereignty while still satisfy-
ing the defense needs of its superpower partner… Canada’s claim to the far 
north emerged stronger than ever.”8 P. Whitney Lackenbauer agrees: Canada 
secured “both sovereignty and security” during and immediately follow-
ing the Second World War.9 These revisionists use examples spanning the 
Second World War and early Cold War to make their arguments, and turn 
to macro-level material such as memoirs, cabinet conclusions, or minutes 
of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development (ACND). Precedent 
setting projects during Second World War included the Alaska Highway 
or the Canadian Oil Road (CANOL); early Cold War examples included 
the Basic Canada-United States Defence Plan, LOng Range Air Navigation 
(LORAN) systems, American Arctic training over-flights, and Joint Arctic 
Weather Stations (JAWS). While these examples and sources are legitimate, 
they rarely provide an “on the ground” account. As such, their arguments 
concerning de facto sovereignty (the chief critique of Grant and Lajeunesse) 
remain somewhat abstract. Focused studies of particular joint programs, 
such as JAWS, facilitate understanding what happened “on the ground” by 
narrowing the scope of research and demonstrate that the Canada-United 
States Arctic relationship was healthy and mutually beneficial.10
 The JAWS program was born in a climate of serious American interest 
in the Canadian north. Rather than bowing to American pressure, Canadian 
officials remained conscious of Canadian interests ensured, both during the 
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negotiations and throughout the program’s tenure, that the United States 
respected Canadian sovereignty. Given the respect Canadian sovereignty 
received as well as Canadian personnel limitations, Ottawa’s slowness to 
“Canadianize” the JAWS program was understandable. Ottawa remained 
wary of the press’ tendency to sensationalize the American presence, but 
gradually developed confidence in the JAWS program’s publicity potential. 
In the end, despite Canada’s financial and operational limitations, its de jure 
and de facto sovereignty were strengthened by the JAWS program.
Map 6. From P.W. Lackenbauer, “Politics of Race, Gender and Sex,” in Aboriginal Connec-
tions to Race, Environment and Traditions ed. Jill Oakes and Rick Riewe (Winnipeg: Aborig-
inal Issues Press/University of Manitoba Press, 2006).
Beginnings
During the Second World War, the United States and Canada both estab-
lished military weather stations across Canadian territory. These included 
American-operated stations in the Canadian Arctic such as Padloping Island 
off the coast of Baffin Island. In 1944 American Colonel C.J. Hubbard of 
the US Army (and associated with the Department of Meteorology at the 
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology) pushed Ottawa to agree to the estab-
lishment of permanent bases in the high north to monitor arctic weather.11 
Little resulted, however, as Ottawa wished to limit American encroachment.12 
At war’s end Canada purchased all of the American bases on its soil so 
that it could regain its solitary claim of ownership in its Arctic.13 By 1946, 
however, the Americans again desired heightened continental defence col-
laboration. Ottawa was flooded with a host of specific American defence 
and civil projects, including LOng Range Air Navigation (LORAN) systems, 
American Arctic training over-flights, and what would become JAWS. The 
respective outcomes of these negotiations have been detailed elsewhere, but 
two general Canadian problems came to light. First, its Arctic islands were 
not yet fully explored and in some regions Canada’s claim relied on the sec-
tor principle.14 This principle was not widely accepted in international law 
and, at least theoretically, American personnel could have discovered new 
islands and claimed them as American territory.15 These fears were partially 
allayed on 16 January 1947 when both Canada and the United States agreed 
to Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) Recommendation 36, promis-
ing to “safeguard the sovereignty and protect the interests of the country in 
whose territory joint exercise [were] undertaken.”16 Canada’s sector principle 
claims were not recognized, but these projects would not be used to challenge 
Canada’s de jure sovereignty. Indeed, McNaughton and subsequent scholars 
argue that Canada’s de jure sovereignty was strengthened by America’s “im-
plicit recognition.”17
Undaunted by Canada’s unwillingness to grant further access, Hubbard 
continued to press for weather stations in the high Arctic. He convinced 
Senator Owen Brewster of Maine to propose a bill requesting funds for the 
United States Weather Bureau to construct, operate, and maintain weather-
reporting stations “in cooperation with… the meteorological services of for-
eign countries.”18 Thus the project would be under civilian auspices. Critical 
writers have dismissed the civilian framework for JAWS as fraudulent. 
Grant decries Canada’s general preference for a “civilian cover” regarding 
American Arctic projects. Lajeunesse similarly describes JAWS as a “mil-
itary project” in which the United States “played its part” by using a civilian 
guise.19 Admittedly, Canada preferred American civilians to military person-
nel. At times, both the American and Canadian military resupplied JAWS 
and the military obviously desired arctic weather information for Arctic 
flights. American Senator Brewster recognized the military importance of 
meteorology but also described the “farming, construction, transportation, 
merchandising, and many other activities” that would benefit from accur-
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ate weather forecasting.20 Thus the American Senate bill explicitly assigned 
responsibility for the stations to the United States Weather Bureau without 
any Canadian input.
After the Senate passed this legislation on 12 February 1946, the United 
States began to stockpile building supplies and post recruitment ads for 
meteorologists.21 Although Ottawa kept “an eye” on these developments, 
American officials did not consult their Canadian counterparts.22 Only in 
May 1946 did Americans arrive in Ottawa to discuss constructing stations 
in Canada’s Arctic islands. Hubbard emphasized the need for such stations 
as well as the urgency given the limited Arctic shipping season. If Canada 
approved, the American transport mission “would start Monday.”23
Shocked by this pressure, as well as number of other American arctic 
requests, the Canadians took their time to consider the American proposal. 
At the forefront of Ottawa’s considerations was Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. 
If approved, the new American stations would be the only occupants in the 
region and possibly compromise Canada’s sovereign claims. After months of 
debate, the Cabinet declined the American request, at least for the time be-
ing, to better situate the proposed weather program within the larger scope 
of continental defence.24 The Americans were “considerably upset and are 
faced with the problem of what to do with the stores and equipment which 
had been loaded at Boston in the hope that a favourable reply would be forth-
coming from the Canadian government.”25 The United States’ presumptive-
ness, however, did not lead it to ignore Canada’s decision, nor force Canada 
to reconsider. Instead they continued to allay Canadian concerns, explaining 
both informally and formally (via Recommendation 36) that the United 
States “had no intention of questioning Canadian sovereignty.”26
Eventually, negotiations approved the construction of nine weather 
stations under a “joint” framework. Canada would provide the Officer-in-
Charge (OIC), pay for the supplies and incomes of its half of the base person-
nel, as well as maintain ownership of all land and structures. The United 
States would construct the buildings, a Weather Bureau official would serve 
as Executive Officer at each station, supply the other half of the personnel 
and most of the site construction personnel, and provide both the sealift and 
airlift required to build and resupply the stations. As time passed, Ottawa 
was free to “Canadianize” any of the American responsibilities. At the 
outset, however, the United States dominated the program in terms of both 
personnel and expenditures.27
Astoundingly, this informal agreement was never formalized by a more 
elaborate exchange of notes. Drafts were discussed and exchanged, but de-
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lays continued for a variety of administrative reasons – including the “over-
worked” U.S. section at the Canadian Department of External Affairs. With 
a sense of irony, Escott Reid (Deputy Under-Secretary for External Affairs) 
noted that his departmental officials were delayed because “no small part 
of their time has, incidentally, been devoted to keeping various phases of 
the Arctic weather station programme moving smoothly.”28 Discussions con-
tinued into 1949 and the desire for a formal agreement slowly evaporated as 
the program’s smooth running made such action seem unnecessary.29 Each 
year the previous precedents were renewed and the unusually informal, but 
successful, bilateral relationship continued.
Initially, start-up materials were flown to Eureka Sound on Ellesmere 
Island in April 1947 and assembled. By mid-July a trio of ships consisting of 
the icebreakers USS Edisto and USS Whitewood, in addition to the freighter 
USS Wyandot, departed from Boston. After stops in Greenland to resupply 
bases there, they ventured west into Canadian waters. Eureka was sup-
plied without major incident but the ice surrounding the planned station at 
Winter Harbour on Melville Island proved impenetrable. After four attempts, 
Resolute on Cornwallis Island was selected as an alternative location and 
became the main site from which all other subsequent JAWS stations were 
resupplied. In 1948 two more stations were established at Isachsen on Ellef 
Ringnes Island and Mould Bay on Prince Patrick Island. During the voyage, 
the two American icebreakers ventured to Cape Sheridan and dropped sup-
plies for a future weather station.30 The ships then turned further north and 
set a new record for the most extreme northern latitude reached by ship. The 
Americans also dominated airlift missions; the RCAF did not even partici-
pate in a limited capacity until 1950. Due to the limitations of the American 
Weather Bureau’s budget and the utility of the existing locations, no further 
JAWS stations were constructed.31
Despite Ottawa’s concerns about Canadian sovereignty, Canada only 
slowly assumed a more active role in the JAWS program for two import-
ant reasons. First, it lacked the personnel to operate the stations which 
typically had a crew of eight that included weather observers, radiosonde 
operators, general maintenance personnel, and a cook.32 Canada suffered 
from a shortage of meteorologists and radio operators willing to go to the 
Arctic. Lajeunesse doubts that the shortage was real, and quotes a meeting 
where some participants argued that: “if we [Canada] scrapped the bottom 
of the barrel and secured the co-operation of the Meteorological Service and 
the Army, Navy and Air Force, we could surely get enough technicians to 
take care of the matter.”33 That this suggestion was not adopted is hardly 
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surprising. Throughout the remainder of the 1940s Ottawa continued to em-
phasize that Canadians would replace Americans at the stations “as soon as 
possible,” but the joint personnel arrangements continued.34 A host of other 
weather stations in Canada, as well as Canadian ships in the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans, also required similarly trained personnel.35 Moreover, due 
to metrological requirements, Canada permitted the United States to reopen 
a few of the former American Second World War weather stations, such as 
Padloping Island. Canadian officials worried that these stations posed a 
much greater hazard to Canadian sovereignty due to the lack of Canadian ac-
companiment.36 The American presence was to be temporary, and Canadian 
officials prioritized stations such as Fort Chimo and Padloping Island for 
Canadianization as soon as Department of Transport (DOT) personnel be-
came available. Padloping was scheduled to be among the last stations taken 
over in 1949-1950.37 Unfortunately, “the manpower requirements for these 
north-eastern stations would not leave any surplus to replace U.S. personnel 
at the two Arctic weather stations.”38 The Canadian military also suffered 
from similar shortages and it was not until 1953 that the Royal Canadian 
Navy (RCN) finally stepped in (instead of DOT) and took over the Padloping 
station – three years later than planned.39 Ottawa justifiably focused on bases 
that lacked any Canadian personnel rather than the JAWS installations, 
where the Americans were not sole occupiers.
Cost was the second deterrent to Canadianizing the JAWS program. 
During the Second World War, the Advisory Committee on Post-Hostilities 
Problems concluded “that in joint planning with the United States, Canada 
should accept full responsibility for all such defence measures within 
Canadian territory.”40 This policy was not followed. Lajeunesse argues that 
Ottawa’s “claims that the construction of these weather stations was beyond 
Canada’s capability appear more like an exercise in parsimony than an ac-
curate assessment of Canada’s capabilities.”41 Indeed each station only cost 
$200,000 to construct and the program’s operating costs (excluding resupply) 
were estimated to be approximately $465,000.42 Unfortunately Lajeunesse 
misrepresents the way Canadian officials conceived cost policy by insisting 
that Canadian officials were unwilling to pay these paltry sums. Ottawa 
coupled personnel and costs when conceptualizing Canadianization of the 
program. Because Ottawa was far more concerned about American personnel 
in the Canadian Arctic, Canadianization of costs was delayed. Documents 
discussing personnel rarely mention these expenses, and when they were 
mentioned, they were considered affordable.43 It seems that the option of 
Canada paying American personnel was dismissed because it would not have 
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strengthened Canadian de facto sovereignty. Furthermore, the Americans re-
quested that their participation remain significant. It was a “joint” program 
after all, and American meteorological equipment was particularly import-
ant. Thus, while incremental Canadianization was within Canada’s rights, 
the Americans did not welcome it and excessive haste to achieve it could 
have led to technical difficulties.44
Moreover, Ottawa was concurrently negotiating other Arctic projects 
with the United States and it was clear that the list would continue to grow. 
A financial precedent regarding Canadian contributions was required; but 
as Bercuson explains:
Canada was reluctant to explore the idea of a specific cost-shar-
ing formula based, for example, on a ratio of national incomes 
or populations because of the inflexibilities that would have 
introduced. One memorandum prepared for King suggested it 
was best to share costs on a project-by-project basis with Canada 
supplying sites, buildings, administration, and housekeeping, 
and some or all of the operating personnel. The United States 
could supply technical equipment, personnel, and the bulk of the 
transport services.45 
With some permutation, this became the precedent for subsequent joint 
Arctic projects. Sometimes Canadian participation in joint projects would 
be “token,” but Washington recognized the symbolic importance. Although 
Ottawa was not concerned about the minimal sums of the JAWS program, 
it was concerned about the wider precedent it could set. Canadianizing a 
project over time created a very different precedent than insisting on heavy 
Canadian participation at the outset. Bercuson insists that this policy suc-
cessfully guarded Canada’s sovereignty, but he only provides a very minimal 
“on the ground” account of the programs discussed.46 Did Canada’s limited 
investment of personnel and money compromise its sovereignty? Although 
there were some initial problems, the United States respected both Canadian 
de jure and de facto sovereignty. In fact, Canadian de facto sovereignty was 
strengthened rather than weakened.
Resupply
Although violations did occur during the decreasingly American annual sea-
lift operations for the Joint Arctic Weather Stations, the severity and number 
of infringements declined after 1948 and remained black marks on otherwise 
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respectful and successful operations. Moreover the infringements that did 
occur resulted from the apathy of some American personnel and were not 
normative statements of the American government as critics such as Grant 
have contended. Ottawa remained understandably eager to Canadianize the 
operations, and did so once it possessed the necessary transportation vehicles. 
The interim, however, was also used to demonstrate continued de facto sover-
eignty. Infringements were brought to the attention of Canadian officials, 
action taken, and American compliance secured. Moreover, such initiatives 
were exceptional; American personnel generally respected Canadian wishes. 
Thus, even while the United States dominated the sealift, Canada continued 
to exercise de facto sovereignty. American personnel and equipment domin-
ated the initial resupply missions. The RCAF possessed transport aircraft, 
but they were tasked elsewhere and did not have enough aircraft and crews 
to do everything.47 Similar naval deficiencies resulted in American domin-
ance of the annual sealift. Although the American government was more 
than willing to work with Canadian vessels, Canada declined since its few 
Arctic-capable ships, such as the CCGS N.B. MacLean, were already commit-
ted in Hudson Bay and the St. Lawrence.48 Both the Canadian Departments of 
National Defence and Transport were constructing new, modern icebreakers 
based on the American “Wind” class to resupply northern outposts includ-
ing the JAWS sites, but the construction program was still in its early stages. 
An RCN vessel was scheduled for completion in 1950, but steel shortages and 
design changes delayed its deployment until 1954. Canada offered the N.B. 
MacLean as a backup for the American icebreakers in case of an emergency, 
but fortunately it was never required.49 Accordingly, Canadian representa-
tion on the early resupply sealifts was limited to Canadian observers on 
American ships and aircraft.
 Initially, Ottawa was wary about JAWS publicity. During the negotiation 
phase, the Financial Post published a series of condemnatory articles argu-
ing that Washington had issued Ottawa “a virtual ultimatum” to increase 
its commitment to continental defence.50 A subsequent article commented 
that the United States was “anxious and eager to get at the work of establish-
ing a proper North American weather service, irrespective of who claimed 
sovereignty over the ice-bound wastes where they wanted to operate.”51 This 
was precisely the sort of publicity that Ottawa wanted to avoid. The PJBD 
recommended that:
Public information in regard to military projects, tests or exer-
cises, jointly conducted or conducted by one country in the other 
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country, or in the territory leased by it, should be the primary 
responsibility of the country whose territory is utilized. All pub-
lic statements on these subjects shall be made only after mutual 
agreement between the appropriate authorities of the two coun-
tries.52
Because joint projects remained essential to future continental cooperation, 
Ottawa tried to downplay the military aspects of the JAWS program – an 
argument that both Lajeunesse and Grant consider to be a guise. When 
introducing it to the House of Commons Prime Minister King described the 
program as “primarily a civilian one to which contributions are made by the 
armed forces.”53 Indeed, aside from the resupply mission, JAWS was civil-
ian run; and it was the United States, not Canada, that selected a civilian 
framework. As such, it would not facilitate an American military invasion 
of Canada’s north. Nonetheless, many Canadians continued to worry, as the 
Visiting Forces debate of 4-6 June 1946 demonstrated.54 Given these emo-
tional arguments, the Canadian government worried, rightly, that import-
ant northern joint projects could be jeopardized by negative public opinion. 
Press releases would be carefully drafted and interviews were not to venture 
beyond released content.55
 These plans were frustrated before the sealift (dubbed Task Force 80) even 
departed. At an American Meteorological Society dinner Colonel Hubbard 
spoke about the JAWS program, and while he did utilize the existing press 
releases he also ventured well beyond their content discussing the resup-
ply roles of Resolute and even envisioned an “indefinite” number of future 
subordinate stations. Normally the venue was free of newsmen, but on that 
evening a journalist from the Washington Star was present and published a 
summary that was then used by Canadian papers. Hubbard and the US State 
Department apologized, but Ottawa bureaucrats were unimpressed.56
 This mishap was merely the beginning. After resupplying Thule, 
Greenland, the Edisto and Eastwind ventured north into Cape Sheridan 
where Colonel Hubbard noticed some cairns. On August 4, after unloading 
supplies at what would later become the Alert site, Hubbard flew to the 
cairns and discovered that they held a liquor bottle containing documents. 
After the bottle was returned to the Eastwind, Commander T. Fife (the sen-
ior Canadian observer) was called was to the bridge, handed the bottle, 
and asked to open it. The bottle contained brief notes from the American 
Peary expedition of 1905-1906 documenting when the expedition arrived in 
the region. The bottle also contained copies of notes from the British Neary 
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expedition of 1875-1876, briefly describing latitudes explored and scurvy 
among the crew.57 
 The documents posed no threat to Canadian sovereignty, but a squabble 
ensued regarding their custody. The Canadian observers argued that the find 
was subject to the Archaeological Sites Ordinance (which, because Hubbard 
lacked a permit granted by the Northwest Territories Commission, would 
require the Canadian officials to seize the documents), while the Americans 
argued they had done nothing wrong and were merely reclaiming docu-
ments from an American expedition (and therefore desired that the docu-
ments be retained by the US Navy). After considerable disagreement Fife 
allowed the Americans to retain the documents. In his assessment, “it would 
be neither polite nor politic to make any such demands at the moment. A 
demand of that nature would very likely result in us being left out of any 
further discovery which might be made.”58 He left it to his superiors to decide 
whether corrective action was necessary.
 After another stop at Eurkea Sound, the Eastwind and Edisto headed 
home. The Wyandot returned to Boston via Godhaven, Greenland, but the 
two icebreakers returned via Fury and Hecla Strait. This was the first time 
the strait had been navigated and many chart errors were corrected. The 
Americans had not asked Canada’s permission to sail this route. Angry 
Ottawa bureaucrats cited documents stating that the United States would 
“consult” Canada prior to any significant route changes. Washington coun-
tered arguing that the planned routes had only be described as “probable,” 
that the American commander retained “operational” prerogative based on 
sea conditions, and that Chouinard (the senior Canadian observer on the 
Edisto) had approved of the route change.59 Since the Wyandot returned via 
the proposed route, Canadian officials later concluded that: 
it is plain from the information already available that the change 
was made not for operational reasons but because Captain Dufek 
wished to do so and because he had forgotten the instruction 
which said he was not to change his route without permission.60
Thus, a host of problems including the embarrassment of American ships 
setting a record at Cape Sheridan, the questionable discovery of the Peary 
documents, and the illegal passage through the Fury and Hecla Strait await-
ed frustrated federal bureaucrats.
 Ottawa knew that the dramatic events of the sealift could not be kept 
secret. While Canadian officials were concerned about Canadian sover-
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eignty, they did not worry that the United States would use the voyage to 
make claims in the Canadian Archipelago and were far more worried about 
“some possible embarrassment for the Canadian Government, vis-à-vis the 
Canadian public, in issuing a statement indicating that the U.S. Navy has 
accomplished these feats on Canadian territory.”61 An initial draft press 
release mentioned the Edisto and Eastwind’s trip to Cape Sheridan, but was 
described as revisiting a region discovered by Neary rather than as record 
setting. Similarly, the voyage of the two icebreakers through the Fury and 
Hecla Strait was not described as a “first.”62
 Ottawa’s efforts to withhold facts about the voyage proved futile. Before 
the joint press release was approved, the New York Times published a front-
page story describing Hubbard’s discovery of the Peary cairn in minute 
detail. The article also described the Task Force’s voyage through “straits 
and channels believed never to have been navigated before.”63 After brief cor-
respondence it became apparent that Hubbard had “a mania for publicity” 
and conducted the interviews without even consulting American officials.64 
William Snow, Assistant Chief of the Commonwealth Affairs Division at 
the US State Department, was “as indignant over this flagrant breach” as 
Canadian officials.65 Although the US State Department wanted a more de-
tailed release than the Canadian draft, it immediately agreed to Canada’s 
proposed text, seized the Peary documents from the USN, and refused to 
publish them until it obtained Ottawa’s consent. Unfortunately this initiative 
failed to calm editorial opinion. The Canadian and American press was now 
aware of the Peary documents, and demanded their publication. According 
to Murray Schumach of the New York Times, the State Department desired 
publication and “the basic cause for delay is the ruffled pride of representa-
tives of Canada.”66 The Montreal Gazette published an abbreviated version of 
Schumach’s piece,67 and ironically criticized the Canadian government for 
not bending to the United States’ wishes. Had Hubbard not violated bilateral 
agreements regarding publicity for joint projects, the Canadian government 
would not have been embarrassed by the utterly innocuous documents. 
Escott Reid was furious: “It was… primarily the Government’s fear of adverse 
reaction from the Canadian public that led it to lay down in the directives the 
general pattern of issuing only one brief release in connection with each ma-
jor development in Canada – U.S. activities.”68 Canada received bad press for 
American misbehaviour, but the texts were released on 30 September with 
Canadian consent.69
 Individuals such as Hubbard, who ignored Canadian sovereignty, 
remained a minority. Canadian sovereignty was generally respected and 
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the operation achieved its goals. ”Considering everything, the Task Force 
went off well,” an internal DEA memorandum commented.70 Nevertheless, 
Ottawa rejected further corrective publicity for Task Force 80, preferring 
that northern activities be “left as inconspicuous as possible” “for political” 
(rather than sovereignty) reasons.71 Even Deputy Minister of Transport Jean 
Lessard’s benign request to publish a photograph of himself receiving a tin 
of potatoes left by the Neary expedition in 1875-76 was rejected. Recognizing 
that “it does seem somewhat ridiculous that there should be any difficulty in 
releasing such a photograph,” the Under-Secretary for External Affairs still 
insisted that:
its release might involve us in some embarrassment since, after 
the recent Washington leakages regarding the Sea Supply Mission 
which led to widespread interest in the activities of the Mission, 
we not only took the U.S. authorities to task for the leakages but 
informed them that, in accordance with the decisions reached at 
an interdepartmental meeting at which your Department was 
represented, the authorities here wanted the Mission to drop into 
obscurity.72
The Under-Secretary speculated that if Ottawa continued to publicize Task 
Force 80, American Departments involved in the sealift might have legitim-
ately done the same.73 Canadian diplomats in Washington vocally denounced 
the American-made situation but their foremost concern remained editorial 
perceptions.74
 Planners for the 1949 sealift acknowledged the mistakes of the previous 
year. When proposing their route for 1949, the Americans mentioned the pos-
sibility of again passing-through the Fury and Hecla Strait.75 Canada asked 
that: “the greatest care… be taken to ensure that information regarding the 
expedition will only be released in accordance with the terms of the Canadian 
and U.S. directives.”76 Mechanisms for joint approval of photographs for the 
press were also developed.77 Sure enough, the publicity for the 1949 and 1950 
sealifts was favourable and coordinated.78 There would be no more rude sur-
prises, the Americans fully disclosed and coordinated their plans with their 
approving Canadian counterparts.
 Most importantly, Canadian observers received proper training. In 1948 
Canada selected its observers well in advance, but these individuals only 
received the appropriate security clearance a few days before the ships de-
parted. Due to the short time remaining, “no attempt to brief even the leaders 
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of the two Canadian parties in their responsibilities, let alone the remaining 
members of the Canadian party or the Americans” was possible.79 Canadian 
observers were thus ill prepared to correct similarly ignorant American be-
haviour. For instance, Chouinard would have likely objected to their passage 
through the Fury and Hecla Strait had he received this education. The 1949 
sealift observers received three full days of instruction.80
 Subsequent sealift missions involved more stops but created far fewer 
difficulties. During 1949, Colonel Hubbard discovered a couple of wooden 
mallet heads in the vicinity of Radstock Bay. Hubbard later showed the arti-
facts to J.W. Burton, the senior Canadian observer for that year:
and explained that he intended taking them home as souven-
irs. I [Burton] explained to Mr. Hubbard that according to the 
Archaeological Sites Ordinance it was not permissible for anyone 
to disturb Eskimo ruins or sites of historical importance or to 
pick up and carry away objects connected with such sites, unless 
he was a holder of an Archaeologists and Ethnologist permit.
Although Hubbard denied knowledge of this ordinance, he likely recalled 
the troubles of 1948, and insisted that: “it was not his intention to contravene 
any Canadian Law, Ordinance or Regulation” and “without any further re-
marks” he gave the mallet heads to Burton.81 In his letter recounting the event, 
Burton advised that the pieces be forwarded to Hubbard since he doubted 
their archaeological value and was pleased that “Canadian Sovereignty 
has been recognized by an Official of the United States Government.”82 The 
government of the Northwest Territories agreed, and Hubbard received 
his mallet heads a few months later.83 The mistakes of the past were not re-
peated. Moreover, this event was the sole exception to an otherwise smooth 
operation. Continuing seaborne resupply operations in the early 1950s were 
similarly uneventful.
 Thereafter, Canada began to take over the resupply missions for the 
JAWS program. The RCAF flew the occasional mission in 1950. By 1951 it re-
supplied Mould Bay and Isachsen from Resolute and was responsible for the 
operation of USAF and its own aircraft during the spring and fall airlift re-
supply missions. In 1952 and 1953 Canadian ships independently transported 
some supplies to Resolute.84 By 1954, Ottawa’s press release emphasized that: 
“for the first time in Canada’s history, a convoy of Canadian vessels” supplied 
all JAWS locations with the exception of Alert. Dubbed “Operation Nors I,” 
the new Canadian icebreaker CGS d’Iberville and the older CGS N.B. MacLean 
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were joined by the CGS C.D Howe and the chartered vessels SS Gander Bay 
(freighter) and MV Maruba.85 The press barely noted this Canadianized initia-
tive.86 By 1955, with the exception of limited USAF participation, the resupply 
of JAWS stations was fully Canadianized. Canada’s increased participation 
was facilitated by its new icebreakers as well as new C-119 Boxcar aircraft.87 
This pattern continued until the 1960s when Ottawa gradually commercial-
ized the airlift.88 Naturally, the annual resupply mission did not produce 
further challenges for Canadian de facto sovereignty. 
JAWS Stations
Like the resupply operations, the initial working relationship at the Joint 
Arctic Weather Stations was occasionally strained; but on the whole it was 
much healthier than its resupply counterpart. Again, violations of Canadian 
sovereignty occurred in the program’s first years of operation, but these were 
soon resolved in ways that satisfied both Canadian and American officials. 
Operations at the Joint Arctic Weather Stations demonstrated de facto sover-
eignty. Moreover, as time passed, this increasingly harmonious environment 
facilitated a more relaxed and trusting attitude in Ottawa. 
 In 1947 two tangible questions arose regarding personnel at Joint Arctic 
Weather Stations: the consumption of alcohol and interaction with wildlife. 
Purchasing or selling alcohol without a permit in the Northwest Territories 
was illegal. Neither American nor Canadian JAWS personnel purchased 
the $1 consumption permits, however, and instead imported alcoholic bev-
erages from home in their luggage. In the American case, this smuggling 
also violated duty laws. The Department of Mines and Resources was aware 
of the practice but had “never taken any action to stop it because we [mis]
understood that the practice was tacitly approved by” the Department of 
External Affairs. Apparently “the American officers are rather surprised that 
they have been allowed to get away with this for so long.”89 American JAWS 
personnel were violating Canadian de facto sovereignty, but since the laws 
were not enforced, and since Canadian JAWS personnel behaved similarly, it 
was difficult to fault American personnel. The lack of an established system, 
rather than disregard of Canadian sovereignty, was to blame.
 During a joint meeting on 11 March 1948, Colonel Hubbard agreed that 
the importation of liquor needed to be regularized and requested a solution 
from the Canadian government.90 The main problem was delivery logistics 
to such remote locations.91 In the end, Canadian OICs purchased permits 
to sell Canadian alcohol, and all JAWS personnel purchased consumption 
permits.92 The problem briefly resurfaced when a still was discovered during 
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the construction of Alert. It is unclear whether the owner was Canadian or 
American, but the OIC promptly ended production of illicit brew.93 This was 
hardly a deliberate challenge to de facto sovereignty; there are no records of 
further violations.
 There was considerable debate regarding interaction with wildlife dur-
ing early JAWS operations. For instance, J. G. Wright, Superintendant of the 
Eastern Arctic and Secretary of the Northwest Territories Council, feared 
JAWS personnel consumed insufficient meat and therefore pushed for lim-
ited caribou hunting – which also helped to relieve boredom. R.A. Gibson, 
the Deputy Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, believed that hunt-
ers would quickly exceed quotas.94 As Peter Kulchyski, Frank Tester, and 
John Sandlos have all noted, in the post-war period bureaucrats like Gibson, 
motivated by modernist scientific discourses, justified imperial policies 
such as the modernization of native life-ways by strictly limiting the native 
caribou hunt. By focusing on the resistance of Canada’s native peoples to 
this modernization discourse, however, these scholars overlook the minor-
ity of Arctic government employees who were also subject to the govern-
ment’s conservation-focused policies.95 The Joint Arctic Weather Stations 
were located on a Game Preserve where only natives (who required game for 
subsistence) or those possessing permits issued by the Northwest Territories 
Commissioner could hunt. The populations of caribou and other species 
remained somewhat limited, and Musk-Ox were out of bounds for every-
one. Since few permanent residents lived nears the stations, JAWS personnel 
at Eureka were permitted to kill up to two caribou per year per person if 
permitted by the Commanding Officer (a Canadian).96 Unfortunately, confu-
sion abounded and in March 1948 Hubbard asked if hunting caribou was 
permitted. Summarizing a subsequent meeting, Wright realized that the 
Canadian government had “never advised the weather station people about 
this concession.”97 The Northwest Territories Council ended the confusion 
the following January when it decided to stop issuing hunting permits be-
cause it believed previous estimates of the caribou population were exagger-
ated and that the species was in serious trouble. From thenceforth, hunting 
was only permitted in emergency situations with the permission of the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police at Resolute Bay.98 There are no records of further 
hunting by JAWS personnel.
 Interest in Arctic wildlife continued. Of particular note is the Smithsonian 
Institute’s request to use JAWS personnel to retrieve a pair of Musk-Ox as 
well as some Polar Bears for the National Zoo. Although this request was 
first issued to the United States Weather Bureau, it was quickly forwarded to 
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the Canadian government. Ottawa instructed that the Smithsonian should 
reissue its request to the Canadian government directly (thereby formally 
recognizing Canadian sovereignty), and also advised that, due to the haz-
ards involved, JAWS personnel would not be permitted to help.99 In short, 
Canada continued to control what happened “on the ground” in the Arctic.
 Beyond diplomatic concerns, Canadian and American JAWS personnel 
developed a strong working relationship. American personnel were particu-
larly compliant during the construction stage. An American recorded that 
relations between American and Canadian personnel during the construc-
tion of Eureka Sound’s station were “good” and all were satisfied with their 
work.100 At Resolute inter-national relations were also good, although “there 
have been minor misunderstandings and some differences of opinion on 
both sides, but these are to be expected in any normal operation of this kind.” 
“Stress and overwork, rather than any personal animosity” were blamed for 
any tension.101 In 1948 a report on the construction of the Isachsen station 
described no nationalistic problems and classified morale as “first-class.”102 
 Canadian bureaucrats continued to worry about de facto sover-
eignty. Some cited potential structural command problems to justify the 
Canadianization of the Joint Arctic Weather Stations. However, Canadian 
personnel limitations and continued amicable relations prevented these 
demands from gaining traction. One memorandum arguing for the full 
Canadianization of JAWS specifically targeted the power structure between 
Canadian OIC and the US Weather Bureau Executive Officer. According 
to the report, the OIC did not exercise overall control of JAWS personnel 
as Americans could also seek recourse through the Executive Officer to 
American channels. Although the author admitted that: “this double chan-
nel does not appear to have caused serious problems” he insisted that the 
potential remained. Moreover, the system also over-relied on strong person-
alities. As an example, the American Executive Officer had slowly taken the 
initiative of command at the Resolute station due to the OIC’s depression 
and eventual suicide. A Canadian replacement was flown in, however, and 
only a year later another observer recorded that “the morale at Resolute was 
exceptionally high and all the personnel appeared to get along together 
very well.”103
 As could be expected there were some personnel problems. One U.S. 
Executive Officer at Mould Bay was a “constant source of friction,” but he 
did not complete his term and was relieved of duty.104 Reports from both the 
Canadian OIC and the American Executive Officer at Isachsen continually 
emphasized good working relations. Cooperation between American and 
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Canadian personnel was occasionally described as “fairly good” but more 
often as “excellent.”105 American personnel at Joint Arctic Weather Stations 
did not compromise Canadian de jure or de facto sovereignty. Furthermore, 
American involvement in JAWS improved Canadian meteorological know-
ledge. Reflecting on the JAWS program in 1955, J.R. Baldwin (Deputy Minister 
of Transport) wrote:
With regard to our relations with the Americans at the Joint 
Weather stations I am pleased to advise that any differences 
experienced with the United States personnel have been of such 
minor character that they could be considered as non-existent. 
We have also enjoyed the full cooperation and understanding of 
the United States officials in our dealings with them.106
Historian Peter Kikkert appropriately concludes that: “individual personal-
ity, not nationality, created most of the tension at the stations.”107 That these 
clashes were so rare is testament to the quality of personnel sent by both 
countries to the Joint Arctic Weather Stations.
 Nevertheless, some Canadian departments, such Mines and Resources, 
continued to push for a Canadian takeover, emphasizing the relatively small 
expense and personnel commitment involved. Most departments, however, 
such as National Defence, Transport, and External Affairs, argued that “ef-
fective occupation was demonstrated by the fact that the officers in charge 
at the stations were also postmasters, justices of the peace, and game war-
dens.”108 Indeed, Canadian bureaucrats eased into an increasingly casual 
attitude regarding JAWS diplomacy. J.H. Taylor of External Affairs’ Defence 
Liaison (1) Division requested that fewer representatives be sent to the an-
nual Canadian-American meetings regarding JAWS since the proceedings 
had become “largely a matter of administration.”109 Previously the ACND 
had discussed JAWS issues at length, but by 1956 merely noted the annual 
joint Canada-United States JAWS meeting.110 By 1961 the joint annual meet-
ings were shortened.111 The JAWS program facilitated amicable and trusting 
relations among bureaucrats from both countries.
 Canadian publicity sensitivities similarly eased with the passing of time. 
By the 1950s journalists were allowed to join resupply missions. Canadian 
briefings for newsmen emphasized Canadian contributions and non-sen-
sationalized reporting led Canada to liberalize reporters’ access to these 
trips.112 Journalists were encouraged by Canadian bureaucrats to visit the 
stations to end any speculation regarding American activities in the Arctic.113 
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Although the sealift was Canadianized by this point, the stations remained a 
joint effort. Ottawa no longer had anything to hide. It trusted the Americans 
to respect Canadian sovereignty and reporters to record this cooperation.
Conclusion
The Joint Arctic Weather Station program was an example of a successful 
partnership. Both countries were interested in developing meteorological 
knowledge, but Canadian concern for its sovereignty complicated arrange-
ments. Ottawa was rightfully worried about preserving Canadian sover-
eignty, but resources were limited and Ottawa weighed its options. Canadian 
officials recognized that de facto sovereignty was not invalidated by dual 
occupancy. Furthermore, most Americans respected Canadian sovereignty. 
While Hubbard indicated disdain for Canadian sovereignty when talking 
with the press, he clearly respected it in terms of hunting and liquor rights. 
Rather than a systematic attempt to challenge Canadian sovereignty, wil-
ful disregard for Canadian de facto sovereignty tended to be contextual. 
Sometimes Canadian sovereignty was inconvenient and thus overlooked; at 
other times simple ignorance was to blame. Ottawa needed to take action to 
correct innocent or wilful threats to Canadian de facto sovereignty, and by so 
doing it strengthened both its de jure and de facto sovereignty. Mutual trust 
increased each time Americans accepted Canadian sovereignty assertions, 
and yielded a stable working relationship. Writing in 1956, E.F. Gaskell of the 
Privy Council Office reflected on the program’s successful record:
As a general observation, I would say that the informal arrange-
ments governing these activities constitute a rather unique situa-
tion. Here is a major project involving two countries and a very 
considerable capital investment flourishing after nearly ten years 
without having been authorized, in the first instance, by a formal 
Exchange of Notes. However [unconventional] this may be, the 
informal agreement – for it is largely that – has paid ample divi-
dends in productive activity.114
It required the sovereignty fervour swirling around the voyage of the SS 
Manhattan 1969 for both sides to contemplate full Canadianization, and all 
American personnel left the JAWS in 1972. Thereafter, the weather stations 
at Alert, Eureka, Isachsen, Mould Bay, and Resolute became part of the 
High Arctic Weather Stations (HAWS) program.115 Contrary to the insistence 
of Lajeunesse and Grant, Canadian officials sought, and achieved a “firm 
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policy” that assured “effective control” of Canada’s Arctic while enjoying 
the advantages of American contributions to the Joint Arctic Weather Station 
system. 
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